Using a unique dataset that links the economic and demographic information of households with the details of their pension formulas, I estimate the combined effect of Social Security and pension benefits on the probability of retirement in a cross-section of the population near retirement age. The accrual rate of retirement wealth is shown to be a significant determinant of the probability of retirement. Simulations of extensions in pension coverage comparable to those that occurred in the early postwar period can account for one fourth of the contemporaneous decline in labor force participation rates.
Introduction
One of the most profound trends in the American economy since the end of World War II is the decline in the labor force participation rates of older workers. After remaining essentially constant at 65% from 1870 to 1937 (Ransom and Sutch, 1988) , the labor force participation rates of men over 60 have fallen 1 continuously. Between 1950 and , male labor force participation rates * Tel.: (1-603) 646-2893; fax: (1-603) 646-2122; e-mail: samwick@dartmouth.edu 1 More recent work by Costa (1997) dates the beginning of the steady decline in male labor force participation to 1880.
decreased from 46% to 17% for those 65 and over and from 87% to 67% for those 55 to 64. Over the same period, participation rates for women 65 and over fell slightly from 9.7% to 8.4%, and the rapid postwar increase in participation for 2 women 55-64 had essentially stopped by the early 1970s. Since most persons do work for some portion of their adult lives, an important determinant of lower labor force participation is earlier ages of retirement.
A leading explanation for this dramatic decline in labor force participation rates has been the contemporaneous growth of the Social Security program. A product of the New Deal, the retirement portion of Social Security is now an entitlement program that covers nearly all workers and retirees. Total receipts of the Old-age and Survivors Insurance trust fund in 1995 were $326.1 billion, compared to $18.5 billion in 1950. In 1995, there were 26.7 million retired workers who collected average annual benefits of $8640. The corresponding figures for 1950 were 1.8 3 million and $3328. Chen (1992) ; Social Security Administration (1994) report that the share of aggregate income of households age 65 and over received from Social Security increased from 22% in 1958 to 42% in 1994.
For over a decade, economists have investigated the importance of higher Social Security benefits as an explanation for earlier retirement using a variety of estimation methods. Surveys of the literature can be found in Atkinson (1987) ; Quinn et al. (1990) ; Diamond and Gruber (1997) . Prominent examples include Diamond and Hausman (1984) ; Burtless and Moffitt (1984) ; Hausman and Wise (1985) ; Burtless (1986) ; Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) ; Sueyoshi (1989) . The general findings of such studies are that although it is possible to estimate statistically significant relationships between the level of Social Security benefits and the likelihood of retirement at various ages, these estimated relationships typically imply a small economic impact of altering Social Security benefits on the average age of retirement or likelihood of retirement. These results suggest that the 4 trend toward lower labor force participation has other explanations.
Pension coverage and entitlements also grew rapidly since the early 1940s and could just as readily be the underlying cause of the decline in labor force participation. Between 1940 and 1973 , the number of retirees receiving pension benefits increased from 200 000 to over 6 million and the number of covered 2 These figures are reported in Special Committee on Aging (1991) . Tabulations of the 1996 Current Population Survey presented in Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997) show that there has been little change in these percentages during the 1990s. Lumsdaine and Wise (1990) document the reduction in labor force participation at older ages in more detail. 3 All figures are from the Social Security Administration (1995) . All dollar amounts are in constant 1995 dollars. 4 One possible explanation for the weak empirical results is the use of cross-sectional variation in Social Security entitlements to identify the effect of Social Security on retirement. International evidence summarized in Gruber and Wise (1997) clearly shows a time-series relationship between reductions in Social Security retirement ages and lower labor force participation rates beyond those ages.
employees rose from 4.1 million to 35 million (Steinberg and Dankner, 1987) . Owing to sectoral shifts in employment and sagging economic growth, pension coverage has leveled off at around 50 million workers-about 44% of the workforce-in more recent years. Finally, Chen (1992) ; Social Security Administration (1994) report that the share of aggregate income of households age 65 and over received from employer-provided pensions (from either private companies or 5 governments) increased from 14% in 1958 to 18% in 1994. More importantly, pension plans are often designed to provide strong incentives for retirement at their specified early and normal retirement ages, as demonstrated in Wise, 1987, 1989) . Luzadis and Mitchell (1991) document significant increases in benefit levels and reductions in early and normal retirement ages between 1960 and 1980. Thus, as pensions have become more pervasive, they have also provided stronger incentives to leave the labor force at earlier ages.
The standard dataset used in past work on retirement has been the Retirement History Survey (RHS). The RHS is a 10 year, biennial panel of approx. 8000 men aged 58-63 in 1969. It contains detailed information on labor supply, earnings, Social Security coverage and health status that are necessary to model retirement behavior. Its information on employer-provided pensions, however, is limited to whether or not an individual was eligible for a pension upon retirement; there is not enough information to construct a reliable measure of expected pension benefits, much less the differences in pension entitlements for alternate years of 6 retirement.
Stock and Wise (Stock and Wise, 1990a,b) develop an 'option value' model of retirement in order to formally incorporate the incentive effects of pensions on 7 retirement. They show that changes in pension formulas have large effects on the distribution of retirement ages from the firm and that the details of the pension formula play a critical role in identifying the model. In order to analyze pension plans in detail, they draw their sample from the personnel records of a single large firm. The use of personnel records limits their analysis in three ways. First, their sample is not necessarily representative of the working population nearing retirement age, especially those without pensions. Second, personnel records do not contain information on other potential determinants of retirement such as health status, household composition and wealth. These factors were shown to be important determinants of retirement probabilities in the prior literature on Social Security and retirement. Third, firm reported data can only determine whether an employee left the firm and not whether he left the labor force. The distinction is critical when evaluating the extent to which the growth of pensions has contributed to the decline in labor force participation at older ages.
This paper is one of the first to use a unique dataset that circumvents the tradeoff of detailed pension data versus a nationally representative household survey to study the economic determinants of retirement. The approach here is to link the demographic, employment and wealth data on households in the Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) (1983, 1986 ) with information on their pension plans in the companion Pension Provider Survey (PPS). The PPS attempted to interview the plan provider for every worker in the SCF (1983) who reported being covered by a pension. The level of detail was such that pension entitlements can be calculated for each worker for any potential year of retirement. Thus, the SCF and PPS together comprise a panel dataset which contains information on the pension entitlements, retirement behavior and economic characteristics of a representative sample of workers. This paper utilizes SCF and PPS to determine whether the results of Stock and Wise (Stock and Wise, 1990a,b) generalize from the personnel records of a single large firm to a more representative sample of workers covered by a wider range of pension plans.
The principal findings of the paper are threefold. First, the significant economic determinant of the probability of retirement is the accrual of retirement wealth due to continued work, not the level of retirement wealth at a point in time. The importance of the retirement wealth accrual is robust to different specifications of the retirement model, but it very much depends on the use of pension wealth data in this analysis. Second, the option value of continued work developed by Stock and Wise (Stock and Wise, 1990a,b) is shown to be a parsimonious but comprehensive measure of future retirement incentives in this more representative sample. In a model analogous to theirs predicting departures from the firm, expanding the sample from employees with pensions to all employees decreases the coefficient on the option value by 25% (but less than a standard error). In a model predicting transitions out of the labor force, the magnitude of the coefficient is more sensitive to the composition of the sample. Third, changes in pension coverage are simulated to have a substantial effect on the probability of retirement. As much as one fourth of the decline in labor force participation in the early postwar period can be attributed to the contemporaneous growth of pensions.
Organization of the paper is as follows. The Section 2 solves a model of the retirement decision in the presence of pensions and explains the incentive effects of pensions on retirement. Section 3 describes the data in the SCF and PPS and documents the considerable variation in pension incentives in the workforce. The econometric model of retirement is estimated in Section 4, with special attention to the contribution of the PPS to the analysis. Section 5 compares the econometric results to previous studies of pensions and retirement that were based on less detailed cross-sections of data. Section 6 presents simulations of the effects of changes in Social Security and pension provisions on retirement. There is also a brief conclusion (Section 7).
Pension formulas and the decision to retire
Central to any economic model of retirement decisions is the assumption that an individual will retire when the value of the financial rewards to postponing retirement by a small amount are just offset by the loss in utility that results from the shorter period of higher leisure. Because employer-provided pensions usually provide different benefit amounts based on age, years of service, and final wages, they comprise an important part of the financial incentives to retire in a particular year. This section describes the features of pension plans that give rise to these incentives, and the next documents the considerable heterogeneity in the magnitude of these incentives in the SCF data.
A simple intertemporal model of consumption, hc j, and retirement, R, is given s by: where hy j is an exogenous stream of income received while working, h p (R)j is a s s stream of retirement benefits that depends explicitly on the date of retirement, d is the discount rate, r is the interest rate, and A is current wealth at time t. The t second argument in the utility function accounts for the (positive) effect of retirement leisure on utility. A continuous time framework is assumed so that the maximand is continuous in the date of retirement. If it is also assumed that pension benefits are a differentiable function of the retirement date (both of these assumptions will be dropped below), the first-order condition for R is:
where l is the shadow value of the constraint in Eq.
(1) and can be interpreted as the marginal utility of wealth at date t. The left-hand side of the equation is the 8 gain in utility that results from a marginal decrease in the retirement date. The right side is the utility value of the change in financial resources that results from a marginal increase in the retirement date. The first term in brackets is the difference between earnings and retirement benefits at R; this is the immediate financial incentive to delay retirement. The second term is the present value at R of the increase in retirement benefits that results from a marginal delay in the retirement date. Pension formulas that provide strong incentives to delay retirement will have larger values of this term. The tendency for pension benefits to increase substantially for greater years of service is known as 'backloading', and it has been widely documented in employer-provided pensions (e.g., Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) ).
Eq. (2) suggests that an important consideration in the decision to retire is the increase in pension wealth that results when retirement is delayed. In order to recast this quantity into one that can be utilized in an empirical model in which individuals are observed at discrete ages, it is useful to consider the actuarial present value of the flow of pension benefits conditional on an employee working through age a and then retiring: 
s s a 21 a I(a) is analogous to wage payments in the sense that the worker's lifetime wealth is augmented by this amount for working at age a; it is a form of compensation for being employed at the job in that year. Adding the wages actually paid to I(a) would yield a 1-year analogue to the right-hand side of Eq. 8 The notation in Eq. (2) assumes c is the same regardless of whether the individual is retired at R.
R
This assumption is valid if the utility function is separable in leisure and consumption. Even if separability is not assumed, the left-hand side of Eq. (2) will be positive as long as the marginal utility of leisure in retirement is positive.
(2). In the subsequent analysis, I(a) will be referred to as the pension wealth accrual (or retirement wealth accrual, if Social Security is included).
Since all pensions are (weakly) increasing in the level of wages in each year, workers with higher values of y will tend to have higher values of I(a) regardless a of the details of the pension formula. Scaling by y focuses on the differences in a pension accruals inherent in the pension formulas rather than differences in wages. The quantity R(a), defined as:
a thereby allows comparisons to be made between the retirement incentives provided by pensions for workers of different wage levels. Fig. 1 shows a schedule for a hypothetical R(a) that is typical of defined benefit 9 pension formulas in the PPS. The features of this plan are as follows. Final average pay is determined by the nominal average of the last five years of wages. The worker earns a benefit entitlement of 1% of final average pay for each year of service. As was the case in 1983, the worker's benefit entitlements are vested after Fig. 1 . Pension wealth accruals relative to wages. Typical DB plan. 9 The calculations for I(a) and R(a) approximate the continuous time expressions with discrete sums of benefits received at each integer age under the reasonable assumption that the value of the payment is fixed over the year. 10 years of service. Early retirement benefits can be taken immediately at any age after the early retirement age (ERA) of 55 as long as the worker has 20 years of service. The worker in Fig. 1 began work at age 31, so he would have 25 years of service at age 55 and be eligible for early retirement. Normal retirement benefits can be taken at the normal retirement age (NRA) of 65, or at any age after 60 as long as the worker is vested.
The two large spikes in the graph occur at the ages when the worker is first eligible for early and normal retirement benefits. Before the ERA, the worker is entitled only to vested deferred benefits that are subject to actuarially fair reduction for every year they are received before the NRA. Since final average pay is not indexed to inflation, vested deferred benefits do not amount to much wealth for young workers. Provided the worker remains with the firm until the ERA, benefits are available immediately at an actuarially favorable reduction rate of 3% per year for each year they are taken before the NRA. The change in reduction factors determines the size of the spike at the ERA; in this case, the increase in pension wealth is equal to twice the annual wage. The smaller spike at age 60, which is equal to about 60% of the wage that year, is the result of the option of taking normal retirement benefits before the NRA if benefits are already vested.
The salient feature of Fig. 1 is that retirement behavior in years near the ERA and NRA should be heavily influenced by the opportunity to get large increments to lifetime wealth by working until those ages rather than retiring immediately. As suggested by Eq. (2), it would be unusual to observe this worker retiring at age 54 given the very high financial rewards to working just one more year-the increment to utility resulting from an extra year of leisure would have to exceed twice the value of the wage.
The key to analysing the effect of pensions on retirement in a cross-section of workers is measuring the different pension incentives for remaining with the current employer for each worker's pension and relating them to actual retirement transitions. The capacity to account for the variation in the retirement wealth accrual patterns confronting a broad sample of workers is the chief contribution of the PPS to the study of retirement behavior. Section 3 describes the cross-section of workers in the SCF at risk for retirement and documents the considerable variation in retirement wealth accruals implied by their pension formulas.
The surveys of consumer finances and pension provider surveys
The Survey of Consumer Finances 1983 (SCF) was designed to be the most comprehensive survey of household wealth conducted to date. In recognition of the growing financial importance of pensions in the economy, the Pension Provider Survey (PPS) was conducted with the households' pension sponsors to obtain the full summary plan description of each plan. Because the SCF also contains detailed demographic and economic data and a re-interview survey was performed in 1986, it is possible to use the two datasets to study retirement behavior in the years between 1983 and 1986. This section describes the sample extract used and the construction of the relevant variables for the subsequent analysis.
The full SCF is comprised of 4103 households in 1983. Of these, 438 are from a sampling frame selected from high income-tax returns and the rest are from an area-probability sample designed to be nationally representative of the population. In 1986, 2822 households were re-interviewed, providing a panel of observations 11 whose interim labor market experience can be analyzed. The sample used below includes all respondents and spouses in such households between the ages of 50 and 69 and working full-time (at least 20 hours per week) in 1983. Individuals were excluded if they reported being self-employed or working in the military services as their main occupation. Individuals were also excluded if they reported 12 being covered by a pension but were not present in the PPS.
After imposing these restrictions, the sample contains 525 individuals. Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables other than retirement variables that will be used in the econometric analysis. For comparison, analogous statistics are presented from the first wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is comprised of individuals age 51-61 in 1992 and will be the dataset used in future retirement studies as more waves are made publicly available. Both sets of statistics are weighted to represent the population at large. The two samples are similar in the proportion female, the proportion married, and years of education. Despite the different age ranges covered, the mean age is also similar across the surveys. The fraction of households reporting poor health (compared to fair, good or excellent) is 1.1% in the SCF, which is about half of the 2.0% that report poor health in the HRS. In the SCF, 65.4% of the households are 13 covered by a pension, compared to 69.8% in the HRS. The SCF's oversampling of high-income households is evident in the mean earnings of $22 028, compared 10 According to the Flow of Funds Accounts (Board of Governors, 1990) , pension fund reserves accounted for $1.392 trillion or 13% of the $11.060 trillion of household sector net worth in 1983. The corresponding percentage was less than 2% in 1945.
11 Avery et al. (Avery et al., 1984a,b) describe the sample construction of the 1983 survey. Avery et al. (1987) discuss the re-interview process and the general quality of the data in the 1986 survey.
12 About 100 observations are censored in this way in the sample used for estimation. In 70% of the cases, contact was made with the pension provider but the survey could not be coded. As discussed in Samwick (1993) , response rates for public sector and educational institutions were all around 90% or more. Response rates for firms with 100 or more employees were over 70%, while response rates for private firms with fewer than 100 employees were slightly over 50%. The effect of this sample restriction is therefore to over-represent public sector workers relative to private sector workers. 13 The exclusion of households that report pension coverage in the SCF but who are not found in the PPS biases the SCF number downward. to $17 724 in the HRS. This difference in sampling design, along with the difference in the age distribution and the earlier time period of the sample, may also contribute to the two extra years of tenure in the SCF. The HRS oversamples ethnic minorities. The fraction who report a racial group other than white is 11.8% in the SCF, compared to 17.6% in the HRS. On balance, the SCF sample is considerably smaller than the HRS but not too dissimilar in its demographic and 14 economic makeup. For Social Security, the SCF reports employment information on the current job and up to three previous ones for each individual. The re-interview survey in 1986 reports information on the job held in 1986 and the circumstances, if any, under which the 1983 job was terminated. The dates of employment, industry, occupation, Social Security coverage, and final wages are given for each job. Crosssectional age-earnings profiles were estimated by sex, race and occupation using the Current Population Surveys for [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , and the coefficients were used to benefit laws for Social Security, the benefits can be computed for each individual 16 for each year in which he or she could retire.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that the use of imputed wage histories fails to capture much of the interesting variation across households in their expected Social Security benefits. The Social Security benefit formula is essentially a weighted average of indexed earnings over the entire work life. Differences across workers due to differences in average wage levels, age and marital status are captured, but the details of spells outside the labor force, transitory shocks to earnings, and earnings early in the work life are not observed. Combined with the absence of major changes to the Social Security formula for workers over age 50 during the sample period, it is not possible to use these data to make precise inferences about the effect of historical changes in Social Security program on retirement patterns.
For pensions, the PPS specifies the exact pension formula for each covered individual. For defined contribution plans, the PPS gives the rates of mandatory, voluntary and matching contributions as well as the formulas for accumulating contributions, vesting and full receipt of the employer's contributions. For defined benefit plans, all formulas for computing vested deferred, early, normal and late retirement benefits are given. Each formula may have its own vesting schedule and include separate definitions of years of service, final average pay or Social Security integration amounts. The full history of plan revisions, including the changes in many plans in the wake of ERISA, is also included. 'Window Plans', such as the one described in Stock and Wise (1990b) , appear to be included only if they are in effect at the time of the PPS interview. Using the information for the current job and the imputation method described above to fill in the wage history with the employer, it is possible to compute the pension benefits for each individual for any 17 year in which he or she could retire. Table 2 presents summary statistics on Social Security and pension wealth levels. Social Security wealth is the actuarial present value of all Social Security benefits the individual would receive if he or she retired in the current year. 16 Social Security is assumed to start immediately for workers over age 62 and at age 62 for workers younger than age 62. The Social Security benefits for married workers are more complicated. If the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of one spouse is less than half that of the other spouse, the lower earning spouse is assumed to be a dependent spouse and, therefore, to have no Social Security wealth while the higher earning spouse has the benefits for a dependent spouse and widow included in Social Security wealth. If the PIA of the lower earning spouse is greater than half that of the higher earning spouse, then the lower earning spouse has Social Security wealth equal only to the value of the retirement benefits that will be collected while the higher earning spouse is alive. The higher earning spouse will have the value of the subsequent widow benefits included in Social Security wealth.
17 All pension benefit streams are assumed to commence at the earliest possible date. This will be the current year for employees eligible for early or normal retirement benefits and an age specified in the pension formula for those entitled to vested benefits. To get a better idea of the distribution of benefits, the bottom panel of Table 2 excludes all observations who are not eligible for both pensions and Social Security. The figures for Social Security are slightly higher, and the mean for pension wealth is now about $40 000 or 75% of Social Security wealth. Median pension wealth is only about $18 000; nonetheless, the medians for both types of retirement wealth are considerably higher than that of financial assets, suggesting that most workers will rely primarily on their pensions and Social Security to finance retirement consumption. Additionally, the standard deviation for pension 18 The estimates of Social Security and pension wealth assume an inflation rate of 4% and an economy-wide real wage growth rate of 1.5%, corresponding to the Social Security Administration's II-B (intermediate) assumptions from this time period. For the purpose of discounting, the standard life tables by age and gender from Faber (1982) and a real interest rate of 3% are used.
wealth is $65 000, or nearly three times that of Social Security wealth. These statistics show that pension wealth is far more concentrated at the top of its 19 distribution than is Social Security wealth. The right-hand side of Table 2 scales retirement wealths by the wage, and this tends to smooth out the differences in the two distributions.
Also presented in Table 2 are the accrual rates for pension and Social Security wealth-the counterparts to I(a) and R(a) defined above. The bottom panel of Table  2 shows that pension accruals are much more dispersed than pension wealth; the coefficient of variation of the former is 6.32 while that of the latter is 1.68. By comparison, the distribution of Social Security accruals is far less diffuse.
Another perspective on the diversity of pension incentives is provided by Fig. 2 . For each plan in the PPS, the value of R(a) is computed for a worker with average wages and coverage under the pension since age 31 for all potential retirement ages. Using the sample weights of the individuals covered by each plan, the 19 One reason why the average Social Security wealth is higher despite universal pension coverage and some large outliers for pensions in this subsample is the fact Social Security benefits are indexed to inflation whereas fewer than 3% of defined benefit pension plans contractually adjust benefits for inflation. Allen et al. (1992) report that about one quarter of defined benefit pension plans in medium and large firms provided some ad hoc increase in benefits between 1983 and 1987. The probability of receiving such an increase is not incorporated in the calculations of pension wealth. distribution of R(a) is formed for each age. The mean, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of these distributions are plotted. Even controlling for tenure, the average accrual graph shows substantial variation by age. Additionally, at every age there are at least 10% of the workers with zero or negative accruals and another 10% with accrual rates two to three times the average.
It is important to note in the interpretation of Fig. 2 that the precise pattern of spikes in the weighted average pension accrual profiles is dependent on the assumption that the worker is hired at age 31 in all cases. While it is true that firms often make available early retirement at ages of 55 and 60, in many cases (such as Fig. 1 ) a worker's eligibility for early retirement benefits depends on his tenure at the firm in addition to his age, with longer tenure workers getting the incentives at younger ages. Woodbury (1997) traces this pattern to the firm's desire to smooth out replacement rates across workers while still giving higher benefits for longer tenures. The particular worker in Fig. 2 is hired at a young enough age that he is eligible for early retirement at the earliest possible age in most cases. Age 31 corresponds to approximately the 25th percentile of the age of hire in this sample for jobs in progress in 1983. The 50th and 75th percentiles are 39 and 46, respectively. The average incentives facing the actual distribution of tenures in the population is substantially smoother by age than that in Fig. 2. 
A basic model of the probability of retirement
Section 3 establishes that retirement incentives in the PPS are often large and vary substantially in the population. This section estimates an econometric model of the retirement decision that assesses the degree to which these incentives affect retirement. Two aspects of the analysis receive special consideration. The first is the contribution of the PPS to the study of retirement beyond what was available in household surveys that did not include pension formulas. The second, addressed in Section 5, is the contribution of the nationally representative SCF sample to the study of the effect of pensions on retirement beyond what is available in samples of personnel records, where the pension formula at a limited number of firms can be directly observed.
Retirement will be defined in two ways in the econometric analysis. For consistency with Stock and Wise (Stock and Wise, 1990a,b) , retirement will first be defined as any termination of employment at the firm where the employee worked in the 1983 survey, regardless of whether it was voluntary or resulted in a total withdrawal from the labor force. Their use of personnel records implied that they could not define retirement based on what the employee chose to do after leaving the firm. However, any attempt to relate changes in pension provisions to the decline in labor force participation must condition on whether the employee leaves the labor force in addition to the firm at which he worked in the initial sample. Consequently, the second definition of retirement includes only transitions from the 1983 job in which the employee leaves the labor force and does not 20 return by 1986, citing a voluntary reason for leaving the 1983 job.
The disadvantage of using the SCF to study retirement is the relatively small number of observations. This disadvantage is compounded by the comparatively short panel of 3 years in the SCF relative to the 10-year panel in earlier studies like the Retirement History Survey. The small size of the sample necessitates a flexible specification of the impact of economic variables on retirement. All retirement models are estimated essentially by comparing the observed retirement behavior in a sample of workers with the value of a function of their economic characteristics. The most straightforward example is a probit model.
The likelihood function for the probit in this sample is:
where F(z) is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal evaluated at z, i indexes the individual, t indexes the year of observation, T is the number of i years at which the individual is observed before leaving the 1983 firm, and y is an it indicator variable which is one if individual i retires in year t. Explanatory variables are included additively in the vector X . The vector b is the set of it parameters to be estimated. Note that s, the variance of the error term, is subscripted by both i and t to allow for heteroskedasticity and serial dependence. In the standard model, s is normalized to unity. The discussion of the incentive effects of pensions in Section 2 implies that, at a minimum, workers who have higher retirement wealth accruals should be less likely to retire in the current year. If I(a) is one of the variables in X, it should have a negative coefficient. Similarly, high wages should discourage retirement because the opportunity cost of leisure is higher. As Fig. 1 suggests, a high value of I(a11) should also discourage retirement at age a, though not by as much as the same value of I(a). High future retirement wealth accruals should also be expected to reduce the probability of retiring in the current year. Stock and Wise (1990a) develop an 'option value' model of retirement that compactly incorporates both current and future retirement wealth accruals. The option value of not retiring in the current year is the possibility of retiring in a later year, when the APV of retirement wealth may be substantially higher. Against the higher wealth must be balanced the foregone leisure during the years of continued work. Their estimation framework was a maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of an indirect utility function that captured this economic tradeoff and allowed for serial dependence and age-related heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
As a reduced form alternative, the option value of retirement can be calculated 21 based on assumed parameter values and used as an explanatory variable in X . In it year t, the option value calculation for each individual who is age a is:
t s s 5t
In this expression, d is a discount factor, g is a parameter of relative risk aversion, p(sut) is the probability of someone age a in year t surviving to year s, and the expectation E (?) denotes the expected value of future income hy j and retirement t s benefit streams h p (R)j, with the latter conditional on retirement in year R. R* is s the optimal retirement date determined by considering all possible dates between t and T and selecting the one that maximizes the right-hand side of the equation. The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents the utility of income received between the current date, t, and the chosen date of retirement, R*. The second term represents the utility of retirement benefits received between the date of retirement and the date of death, T. The means through which the added leisure during retirement increases utility is by multiplying the retirement income stream by a factor k, where k.1. The option value is calculated by subtracting the third term, which is the utility of retirement benefits received between the current date and the date of death if retirement occurred immediately. As discussed in Section 2, added years of service will generally make p (R*).p (t), and the s s difference could be quite large if the period between t and R* includes the early retirement age for the pension and therefore a very large pension wealth accrual. This option value represents the financial incentives to delay retirement from the current date to the most financially advantageous date to retire in the future. Other things equal, a higher option value should reduce the probability of retirement in the current year. Plausible values for g and k that are consistent with those in Stock and Wise (1990a) are 0.75 and 1.5, respectively. A value of 1 for g would imply riskneutrality; i.e. only the present value of future payments would be relevant. A value of 0.75 implies that the individual would prefer that a given present value of income and benefits be distributed evenly over all years. The chosen value of k implies that individuals would be indifferent between working to earn $3 and retiring to collect only $2. The value of d has been set so that future streams of payments are discounted at a 3% real discount rate. Table 3 presents the results of the probit models specified in Eq. (6) using three different from zero at the 1% significance level. The option value calculation incorporates the current year's wage like any other income payment. The insignificant coefficient on the wage in this specification indicates that it has no further effect on retirement beyond its impact on the option value. The coefficient on the level of retirement wealth is positive and statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient on financial assets is over 100 times smaller and insignificant. These estimates suggest that there is no tendency for those with higher financial wealth levels to use it to enjoy longer periods of retirement, but there is some evidence that higher values of retirement wealth lead to a higher probability of retirement. Among the demographic variables, only age is significantly related to the probability of retirement, with those at higher ages more likely to retire. By comparison, the point estimate on tenure is negative, one-third the magnitude, and not statistically significant. The point estimate on poor health is large-equivalent in magnitude to being over 10 years older-but the limited variation in the health status variable makes the estimate insignificantly different from zero.
The models in the other two columns of Table 3 use progressively less information about retirement incentives to predict retirement. The second column uses only the present value of retirement wealth and the current year's accrual of retirement wealth. This corresponds to entering APV(a), I(a) and y separately as a explanatory variables. The coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual is negative 23 and statistically significant at the 1% level. Computed at the means of the explanatory variables, the marginal effect of an additional $1000 of retirement wealth accrual is to decrease the probability of retirement by 0.35 percentage points. The coefficient on current wages is negative but not statistically significant. 22 The standard errors for the probits are calculated according to the method in Rogers (1993) . In addition to being robust to heteroskedasticity, they allow for correlation in the error terms across observations of the same individual in different years and across different members of the same household in any year. 23 The estimates in Table 3 omit five individuals who have retirement wealth accruals greater than $230 000 during the sample period. If they are included, the results are driven entirely by two individuals who retire nonetheless. The root of the problem in both cases is the self-reported measure of the number of years the individual has been working for the same firm. For example, one is age 60 and claims to have 9 years experience. Cliff-vesting at 10 years of experience and a wage over $150 000 generate the large pension accrual. If actual experience is 10 years already, then the worker has actually responded to the large accrual as model predicts by staying with the firm through the current year and then retiring. Ideally, the possibility of this measurement error could be taken into account directly in the maximum likelihood specification.
In this specification, the coefficient on retirement wealth is still positive but insignificant, as is that on financial assets.
This model can also be estimated by including pension wealth and accruals separately from Social Security wealth and accruals, rather than imposing the restriction that their coefficients are equal. The coefficients on both Social Security and pension wealth are unchanged and remain insignificant. The coefficient on the Social Security wealth accrual falls to 20.0161 and is insignificant. The coefficient on the pension wealth accrual changes very slightly to 20.0222 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The p-value for the test of equality of the accrual coefficients is 0.80. In this sample, the identification of the retirement wealth accrual coefficient comes more from the variation in pensions than from the variation in Social Security. This is to be expected based on both the wide heterogeneity in pension formulas documented in Section 3 and the imputations that were necessary in the construction of the Social Security variables.
The estimates in the third column correspond to the type of model that is found in the prior retirement literature that lacked detailed information on pension wealth and accruals. The measures of retirement wealth and accruals contain only Social Security information. Pensions are included only through an indicator variable for pension coverage. The point estimate on the retirement wealth accrual is slightly lower when it excludes the pension wealth accrual, but it is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on pension coverage is negative, suggesting that workers with pensions are less likely to leave their jobs, but the coefficient is only the size of its standard error. This insignificant finding is not surprising in light of the estimates in the first two columns. Having a pension when the option value is high will discourage retirement, but having a pension when the option value is low will encourage retirement. Table 4 re-estimates the models from Table 3 using the more narrow definition of retirement that includes only transitions in which the employee leaves the labor force and does not return by 1986, citing a voluntary reason for leaving the 1983 job. In the specification that uses the option value calculation, its coefficient is almost unchanged at 20.1466 but is now significant at only the 15% level. The coefficient on retirement wealth also loses most of its statistical significance. The coefficient on age is larger and more statistically significant than in Table 3 , but the marginal effect of another year of age is roughly 0.45 percentage points at the sample means in both specifications. The coefficient on poor health is now only three times that of age. The coefficient on tenure switches from negative to positive but is still insignificant. As in Table 3 , the coefficients on education, married and race are negative and insignificant, and that on financial assets is positive and insignificant. Net equity in housing has a small but significantly negative effect on retirement in both specifications. Unlike Table 3 , the coefficient on female is now positive and about 50% larger than its standard error, suggesting that women are somewhat more likely to retire though no more likely to leave their job without leaving the labor force entirely. Author's calculations using SCF and PPS. The dependent variable is 1 if employee retires from the labor force, 0 otherwise. The retirement wealth and accruals include both Social Security and pensions in Column 2 but only Social Security in Column 3. No. of employees: 520; no. of observations: 1389. All dollar amounts are in thousands. All specifications include 2 indicator variables for year. The reported standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering within households.
The next two columns use the 1-year accruals in retirement wealth rather than the calculated option value. In the specification that uses pension data to construct retirement wealth, the coefficients on the retirement wealth accrual and the wage level are both negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the level of retirement wealth is positive but insignificant, and the coefficients on the other variables are similar to those in the first column. In the specification that excludes pension wealth and accruals, the coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual is about 50% larger than in the specification that includes pension wealth, but its standard error is so large that the new estimate is not significantly different from zero or the estimate in Column 2. The coefficient on retirement wealth is negative but insignificant. The coefficient on the dummy variable for pension coverage is still insignificant but is now estimated to be positive. Having a pension seems to discourage leaving the firm, but given a departure, having a pension encourages making the transition into retirement.
The models in Tables 3 and 4 assume that the effect of age on the probability of retirement is linear. Fig. 3 graphs the predicted hazard rates at each age from the option value model and the retirement wealth accrual variable (from Table 4 ) against the actual retirement hazard in the data. The hazard rate at a particular age is the probability of being retired at that age conditional on not being retired at any prior age. Both models clearly fail to predict the sharp increase in the retirement hazard at age 62, the date at which Social Security benefits can first be collected. As discussed in Lumsdaine et al. (1992) , this inability to predict the large spike at age 62 is typical of cross-sectional models of retirement. This discrepancy could be 'corrected' by including indicator variables for all age levels as explanatory variables. The predicted hazard rates would then trace out the mean retirement rates by age, with variation around the mean provided by the other variables in the model.
Estimates of the models in Table 4 with a full set of age variables rather than the linear term yield coefficients of 20.1594 on the option value and 20.0256 on the retirement wealth accrual, with p-values of 0.208 and 0.011, respectively. The corresponding estimates for the models in Table 3 are 20.1707 and 20.0220, with p-values of 0.015 and 0.001. The estimated coefficients are therefore not greatly affected by tailoring the specification to match the age-specific hazard rates in Fig. 3 , and they do not lose much of their statistical significance. In all cases, the test of the null hypothesis that all the age effects are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level, although the dummies for age 62 and age 65 24 are individually significant.
The sample of households used to estimate retirement in the SCF is unusual in two respects. The first is that it includes women in addition to men, whereas most previous studies focused only on the retirement behavior of men. In the SCF sample, imposing this restriction results in a sample size of 312 employees and 836 observations. For the specifications from Table 3 , the coefficient on the calculated option value is 20.1607 with a p-value of 0.002, and the coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual is 20.0150 with a p-value of 0.013. In both cases, the estimates are within a standard error of the values in Table 3 . The second unusual aspect is the presence of the high-income sample. When the high-income households are excluded, the sample contains 403 employees and 1061 observations. For the specifications from Table 3 , the coefficient on the calculated option value is 20.2090 with a p-value of 0.042. The coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual is 20.0449 with a p-value of 0.000. If instead the observations are weighted by the sample weights used in Tables 1 and 2 , the coefficient on the calculated option value is 20.2438 with a p-value of 0.000, and the coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual is 20.0337 with a p-value of 0.001. The retirement incentive effects appear to be larger for those with lower income than for those in 25 the high-income sample.
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 establish that the retirement wealth accruals 24 A more formal way to account for the age-specific retirement rates is by estimating a hazard model such as those in Diamond and Hausman (1984) ; Hausman and Wise (1985) . The hazard model takes the underlying hazard rate by age as given and constrains the effect of the other covariates to simply multiply the baseline hazard at each age. The coefficients on the calculated option value and retirement wealth accrual are both negative, with p-values of 0.053 and 0.010, respectively. See Samwick (1998) , the working paper version of this article, for a full discussion of the results for the hazard model and all other estimates that are reported in the text but not listed in Tables 3-5. 25 A study of job transitions in panel data must control for possibly nonrandom attrition of households between the original 1983 survey and the 1986 reinterview survey. Appendix A of Samwick (1998) develops a bivariate version of the retirement probit in which full-information maximum likelihood is used to control for the possibility of sample selection. Because the estimated parameters in the retirement equation are similar to those reported here, the univariate specification will be maintained.
have statistically significant effects on the decision to retire. This result obtains using the current year's retirement wealth accrual and the calculated option value of retirement. When data on pension wealth and accruals are not used, as many past studies of retirement were constrained to do, the impact of retirement wealth accruals on the decision to retire is roughly the same in magnitude but not statistically different from zero. The dummy variable for pension coverage in that specification is insignificant for both definitions of retirement and differs in sign across the two definitions.
Comparison to previous option value estimates
The SCF data can also be used to assess the generalizability of the results in Stock and Wise (1990a) and their subsequent work. As discussed in the Introduction, there are three dimensions along which the SCF sample provides more variation than the Stock and Wise (1990a) sample of personnel records from a single large firm. The first is that personnel records do not contain information on wealth held outside of the pension plan or demographic characteristics of the employee other than age. The reduced form specifications estimated in Tables 3  and 4 also included demographic variables for tenure, education, gender, race, marital status and poor health. All were estimated to be insignificant, suggesting that their omission from personnel records is not critical. Financial assets were estimated to have an insignificant effect on retirement, and housing net equity had a negative effect on retirement that was statistically significant but small in magnitude.
The second potential limitation of personnel records is that they cannot distinguish between departures from the firm that lead to withdrawal from the labor force and those that do not. Because transitions out of the labor force occur with less frequency than do departures from the initial sample firm, the standard marginal effect calculation needs to be scaled by the predicted probability of retirement in order to compare the effect of pensions on retirement across two different dependent variables. For any variable j in the probit model, this statistic is:¯¯≠
where f(z) is the probability density function of the standard normal evaluated at z and the bar over x denotes the sample average of the variable. For the option value variable, this statistic is 0.283 for the broad definition of retirement in Table 3 and 0.346 for the narrow definition in Table 4 . For the retirement wealth accrual variable, this statistic is 0.039 for the broad definition and 0.056 for the narrow definition. Based on these comparisons, the estimates in Stock and Wise (1990a) based on the broad definition of retirement likely understate the full impact of pensions and Social Security on retirement from the labor force. The third difference is that there is less variation in the budget constraints and preferences across observations in a sample of salesmen at a given firm than in the SCF. It may be that the workers at the particular firm are not representative of the population of workers that is at-risk for retirement. As a first step in investigating the consequences of this restriction, Table 5 excludes all employees who do not have both pension and Social Security wealth. The first two columns define retirement as all departures from the firm. The coefficient and statistical significance of the retirement wealth accrual are virtually unchanged. The coefficient on the option value is about one third larger in magnitude but within a standard error of the original estimate, and it remains highly significant. The last two columns define retirement as departures from the labor force. The coefficient on the retirement wealth accrual increases in magnitude by one fifth and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the option value triples and becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. The significance of the results in Tables 3  and 4 is therefore not an artifact of differences between those with pensions and those with no pensions. Quite the contrary, selecting the sample according to pension coverage tends to overstate the importance of pension incentives on retirement.
By how much do pensions and social security affect retirement?
The estimates in Tables 3-5 show that both the 1-year accrual in retirement wealth and the option value of retirement have statistically significant, negative effects on the probability of retirement. In order to determine the economic content of these results, this section uses the estimates from Table 4 to simulate the change in labor force participation rates in response to changes in Social Security and pensions. As in the estimation of the models, the contribution of the PPS to the study of retirement can be inferred from a comparison of the predictions of the different models.
The long-term forecasts of the solvency of the Social Security system suggest that there will be future reductions in the value of benefits. According to Trustees Report (1995), benefit cuts of approximately 20% would restore the solvency of the program when the trust fund is exhausted. To simulate the effects of such a reform, I assume a 20% decrease in the Social Security PIA (for all earnings levels) from its level in 1983 and calculate the new predicted probability of retirement for each observation. These new probabilities yield a new cumulative distribution function for the probability of being retired by each age. For a decrease in benefit levels of this magnitude, both the option value model and the retirement wealth accrual model predict a reduction in the probability of being retired by age 70 of about 1 percentage point. The explanation for the small magnitude of this effect is that it is the accrual of retirement wealth rather than its level that is the significant predictor of retirement. A uniform reduction in the generosity of Social Security benefits does not alter the relevant incentives by enough to generate substantially different retirement behavior. Another policy change that can at least partially restore solvency to the program is to increase the normal retirement age. The second simulation immediately changes the normal retirement age for Social Security receipt from 65 to 67. As in the 1983 legislation that phased in this increase over several decades, the increase in the normal retirement age also increases the reduction for taking retirement benefits early at age 62 and decreases the delayed retirement credits for postponing retirement to age 70. Applying the same methodology as in the benefit level simulation, both models that incorporate pension wealth data again predict a decrease in the cumulative probability of retirement between 50 and 70 of about 1 26 percentage point.
It is also possible to reassess the importance of pensions suggested by the analysis of Stock and Wise (1990b) in light of the more representative sample of employees with pensions. One systematic change to pension incentives would be that employers were mandated to provide a pension to all employees. In the current sample, that corresponds to approximately a 50% increase in coverage. For the purposes of the simulation, the actual pension formula introduced corresponds to that graphed in Fig. 1 above. The pension entitlements under this plan for all employees without pensions were calculated and used to simulate new retirement rates.
Extending coverage in the form of this defined benefit plan leads to a 4.9 percentage point increase in the probability of retiring between ages 50 and 70. Beller and Lawrence (1992) report that the growth of pension coverage between 1955 and 1975 (or 1950 and 1970) was also about 50%. Luzadis and Mitchell (1991) provide evidence that the growth in pensions during this period was disproportionately in those which provided retirement incentives similar to those in Fig. 1 . Special Committee on Aging (1991) documents a reduction in the labor force participation of men over 65 from 39.6% to 21.6% or 18 percentage points. Thus, growth in pension coverage can account for approximately 27% of the relevant decline in labor force participation rates.
When pension wealth data are not used in the estimates, the predicted increase in the probability of retirement is only 1.5 percentage points, based on the indicator variable for pension coverage in the third column of Table 4 . Failing to account for pension incentives drastically underestimates the effect of pensions on retirement. However, when only the retirement wealth accrual is used instead of the option value model, the predicted change in the probability of retirement is 7.3 percentage points. The reason this estimate is about 50% higher than the one using the calculated option value is that it fails to account for the possibility of receiving the second large pension accrual (for early receipt of normal retirement benefits) after the early retirement age. Anyone with a sufficiently large pension accrual at the early retirement date takes advantage of it when only 1 year of accruals is considered. Under the option value model, some employees find it better to continue working and receive the second large accrual as well.
Conclusion
This paper has documented the importance of formally modeling pension incentives for retirement in a cross-section of the population. Both the option value of retirement and the accrual in retirement wealth are statistically significant in reducing the probability of retirement. There are two results of the analysis that are particularly important in considering the effects of pensions and Social Security on retirement. First, it is the change in retirement wealth, rather than its level, that affects the decision to retire. Second, it is pensions, not Social Security, that primarily determine the change in retirement wealth. As a result, changes in Social Security that are typical of past and proposed legislation are simulated to have modest impacts on labor force participation of about 1 percentage point. It is worth reiterating that the small effects found in Section 6 may well be the consequence of the imprecision in the imputed wage histories that are critical determinants of Social Security benefits.
There is better evidence that the growth in pension coverage during the early postwar period contributed to the decline in labor force participation. Increasing coverage by approximately 50% generates a reduction in labor force participation of about 5 percentage points. This reduction is roughly 27% of the actual reduction that occurred during the period when pension coverage was extended by this amount.
By comparing the estimates and simulations from different specifications of the retirement models, the contribution of detailed pension datasets such as the PPS can be assessed. In this study, omitting pension information entirely leads to the erroneous conclusion that retirement wealth accruals and pension coverage have insignificant effects on the probability of retirement. Including even the 1-year accrual in pension wealth reverses this conclusion and generates an important effect of pension incentives on retirement. For studying pension incentives, however, the 1-year accrual of retirement wealth is insufficient. Simulations based on only the most immediate accrual tend to overstate the effect of pension coverage on retirement. In order to properly account for the tradeoff between retirement leisure and financial incentives to stay at a given firm, the retirement wealth accrual through the most advantageous year to retire-which is not necessarily the next year-must be incorporated. The version of the option value model of Stock and Wise (1990a) implemented here is able to accomplish this.
The use of a unique dataset allows the results in two existing strands of the literature on retirement to be tied together. Many past studies have found small effects of Social Security on the probability of retirement in a cross-section of workers. There is nothing in the results presented here to suggest that those findings were misleading because the data used did not include comprehensive information on pension wealth accruals. More recent studies of pensions on the timing of retirement have found substantial effects of the details of pension formulas on retirement. The use of a more representative sample can qualify those initial results. The failure to model demographic variables explicitly had no substantive effect on the estimates. Focusing on only workers who had pensions slightly overstated the effect of pensions on job turnover, while the effect of pensions on departures from the labor force was somewhat larger than the effect of departures from the firm.
